INTRODUCTION
The
Indo Pak conflict of 1971 is an imp milestone in the history of the Indian sub-
continent. It carved out an indep and
sovereign state of Bangladesh by a finely orchestrated performance by the
Indian Nation in which the political, diplomatic and the mil constituted
distinctive components, each making its own contribution to the ultimate
harmonious whole. It brought honour and
glory to our Armed Forces and resurrected its pride after the Himalayan blunder
of 1962 and the not so decisive 1965 war.
It also cut Pakistan from one-fifth of India’s size to one-tenth of its
size.
If
Pak was cut to size and humiliated in the third Indo Pak conflict of 1971, it
was basically Yahaya Khan’s handiwork.
This Khan raised the axe on the body of Pak on 25th day of
Mar 1971, when he embarked upon the brutal crackdown in Dacca and then hacked
repeatedly at the body like a demented desperado, as for nine months he
massacred Bengalis. Yahya Khan will go
down in Pakistan’s history as the architect of Pakistan’s disintegration.
The
war was thrust upon the Indian State with the influx of more than 10 million
refugees into the simmering cauldron of Eastern India which was already
disturbed by anarchical communist activity and tribal unrest. This witch’s brew aboil generated for India
the gravest crisis of last twenty four years, a crisis that might have left
permanent indelible scars behind. The
refugees brought in many problems to the recipient country, such as security,
health hazards, economic dis-equilibrium, social tensions and a threat to law
and order in the affected regions. The
financial and economic strain with the resultant socio – economic tensions in
the affected region flung a spanner into India’s development plans. Unless the refugee problem was tackled, there
was an imminent threat of political unrest, ethnic clashes and the like. No nation in history had been saddled with
the burden of ten million refugees and hence, India had no alternative but to
guide a dictatorial regime in Pakistan on to the right track.
This
conflict enriched India’s freedom, secularism and democracy- the core values of
the Nation. This laid the foundation
stone for emergence of India as the dominant power of the region. This war has not been won by us on numerical
superiority, which infact was considerable, but because of superior tactics and
strat and above all because of superior fighting qualities of the Indian
soldiers.
POLITICAL
AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
India
always followed the principle of non interference in the internal affairs of
its neighbours. Mrs Indira Gandhi, then
PM, of India remained neutral in the face of massive bloodshed and lawlessness
which had swept East Pak. However, the
influx of refugees, the hy cost of their resettlement and large No of killings
of innocents forced India to act.
It
is the utter disregard to human rights violations by Pak Army which made India
initiate political and diplomatic efforts and draw the world attn to the
gravity of the sit.
Scenario in West. The
refugees from East Pakistan were piling up on the borders of West Bengal and
Assam. This led to an opportunity for
infilt of Pak agents into the Indian Territory.
Further, for reasons of security, foreign relief agencies that were
being used by Pak agents had to be prohibited from entry refusing a great deal
of valuable med and financial aid. Mrs
Indira Gandhi utilized Indian Red Cross under the leadership of Padmaja Naidu,
once Governor of West Bengal, who was well accepted by the people. Funds were allocated from the central
exchequer for relief wk. India was not
an affluent nation to sp the people who did not belong to her.
At
the end of Mar 1971, Mrs Indira Gandhi appealed to UN Secy Gen Mr U Thant to
intervene and advise Pak to ex restraint and stop slaughter of East Pak. In reply, Pak informed UN not to interfere
with the internal affairs as it was not within the scope of UN. Mrs Gandhi made an all out effort to enlist
the sp of world powers to persuade Pak to re-est peace and harmony in East Pak.
Six
days after the crackdown in Dacca, the Indian Parliament unanimously demanded
imdt cease-fire and cessation of the use of force and the massacre of
defenceless people of East Pakistan. The resolution assured the people of East
Pakistan that their struggle would receive the whole-hearted sp of India.
By
end Apr 71, the refugee influx had reached a rate of 60,000 per day. It was computed that the fig would reach 10
million in Oct 71.
Mr
Chow-En-Lai served notice on India that China would sp Pak if India attacked
Pakistan.
In
Jun 1971, Siddhartha Ray, Minister of Edn at the centre was made in charge of
relief wk to the refugees. Throughout
the entire period of the East Pak affair, Mrs Gandhi without losing her
composure acted with strength and restraint as a true ldr.
As
a counter to Sino-US axis in sp of Pakistan, India decided to sign the historic
Indo-Soviet Treaty on 09 Aug 71. With
this treaty India was able to eff counter the threat of Chinese as well as
American intervention.
PREP
AND PLG
India’s Problems
The
Indian press and other propaganda media narrated the brutality of Pak Army and
horrifying tales of genocide. They
advocated using this opportunity of a lifetime to settle scores with Pak. All eyes were focused on Indira Gandhi, known
for her decisive, resolute and timely actions.
Since she made no move, her colleagues, her party men, opposition
politicians and impatient public began to talk of her inaction. Some retired Generals publicly argued in
favour of immediate mil action for the liberation of East Pak before the Pak
forces were strengthened by the arr of hy wpns and amn by the sea. It was time to act now or never, they echoed.
Some
of them accused Gen SHFJ Manekshaw, Chief of the Army Staff, of developing cold
feet. But SHFJ Manekshaw had his own
justifiable reservations about instant action.
He was against half baked, inconclusive involvements and had the moral
standing to withstand pressures against his convictions. He wanted to lead a victorious army and not a
hastily committed rabble. And there he
stuck, and for very valid reasons.
The
quantum of force he needed to launch
this ops would require time to collect,especially so when the immediately
available fmns were tied up with the West Bengal elections, and others had to
be found from operationally committed tps in CI and other holding roles in far
flung areas. By the time the force was
collected the monsoon would be on its way, thus leaving a very tight schedule
for the ops.
A reason he kept to himself was the
shortage of stock piled res of essential, specialized and armd vehs and of
course of br eqpt which would need some time to make up and recoup. In addn, raising new units and fmns and the
intro of newly acquired eqpt was in progress and this needed time to
assimilate. Even with crash programming,
these tasks could not be completed before the onset of monsoons.
The
Preparation
No
country can afford to be in a state of preparedness for war at all times. The cost would be colossal, all that can be
done is to have updated contingency plans and to dply the available resources
judiciously. Gen Manekshaw was Chief for
two yrs and was also Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee. In the process of making the army
battleworthy, he had become aware of its strong points as well as its
shortcomings. One of the reasons for his
recommendations against immediate mil action was the army’s shortfall in
preparing for war and he started to remedy it straightaway by:-
(a) Gearing
up production.
(b) Making
up res.
(c) Make
units and fmns fit for war.
(d) Rationalisation
of eqpt.
(e) Placement
of amn at the right place.
(f) Repairs
of wpns and eqpt.
(g) Change
over pgme.
(h) Making
up of manpower shortages.
(j) Embodiment
of TA.
(k) Constr
of rds and trs.
(l) Build up of adm infrastructure.
(m) Conc
of strike/holding fmns.
(n) Upliftment
of morale.
Prelude to War
At
the end of Mar came the crucial
meeting between Sam and the
Cabinet regarding
intervention in East Pakistan
after the crack-down by Gen Tikka Khan’ s forces
on the fateful night of 25 Mar 1971. Mrs Indira Gandhi
virtually ordered Sam to move the Army into East
Pakistan and said that she and
her government were prepared for war if required . Expecting a war without
going into the vital aspect
of the preparedness of the army”. According
to SAM the Army was not prepared for war. Soon Himalayan passes would
open up resulting in a
threat from China which
could not be be taken lightly .
The Chief went on to point out that his Armoured Division
was in Jhansi /Babina. Besides
while one his infantry
divisions was in Samba in Jammu
and Kashmir and the other
in Andhra Pradesh /Tamil Nadu, and
were so far apart , only
eleven of his eighty nine tanks
were operational as the Finance Ministry was not sanctioning adequate
funds. Also the
rains in the East would
begin in Apr /May. The Prime Minister was then asked by Sam to give her orders for the
army in the above circumstances . She adjourned the Cabinet
till the evening. Also
she asked Sam to stay
back and inquired if the
picture painted by him was
authentic and she
got an affirmative for the answer.
Manekshaw gave a sterling example
of professional honesty in the
above mentioned episode
where he brought home
to the political leadership the
pitfalls of launching an offensive in the summer of 1971. He also highlighted the
lack of equipment and
problem of logistics. Apart
from all this he brought
to bear on the leadership the threat of a Chinese intervention
with the snows on the
passes having melted. It required moral courage of a high
order to do all this, basic ingredient
of good leadership. Once the
decision was taken, Sam Manekshaw
gave a solemn assurance to the
Prime Minister that he would
conduct a lightening campaign to overrun
East Pakistan in a matter of two weeks. This
proved accurate as the
Bangladesh War concluded
in 14 days. On being
asked by Madam Gandhi
as how much time would be required
for preparation to launch the
offensive, he replied that late November would be right time as this
will bring to a naught the chance of a
Chinese attack (with the onset of winter).
In the intervening six
months he buried himself preparing
the army for war working
in tandem with the other two
services.
In
the actual run up to the battle, Sam was able to prepare
the Army well.He was able to give a big boost to tank production which
resulted in the production
of Vijayanta tanks ahead of schedule
.
Sam
had obtained a sanction from the Prime
Minister in the early
days of the crisis of raise a
guerilla group to work in tandem with the “Mukti Bahini ” freedom fighters army of East Pakistan . Training of
8000 guerrillas in border areas was to
be taken care of in three months.
About 400 naval commandos and
frogmen were trained to bring about an effective offensive
against port facilities.
On
the Western border India was required to
face well equipped and strong armour , Manekshaw was able to build up strong
defences so that the army was ready
for the onslaught on this front
during the intervening months
after the Mar episode
.The deployment which took place by the onset of winter left little scope for strategic
surprise in this area.
In
the Eastern Sector during
the run up to the battle, some
brigades had been moved down from the Indo-China border. Both in the run up to the war as in the
actual operations, Sam functioned as an exceedingly good Chairman of the Chiefs
of Staff Committee. He took along with
him the other Chiefs of Staff, Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, DFC and Admiral SM
Nanda.
His
direct access to the Prime Minister also proved a boon in getting the pressing
requirements for arms and equipment approved directly by Mrs Gandhi and then
being sent to the government bureaucratic channels for action. Needless to say they were taken care of at
express speed as no bureaucrat had it in him to take on the Prime Minister’s
dictat.
No comments:
Post a Comment