- Report of the Officials - Part 1 (1961)
| Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question (published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1961) — Part 1
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Report of the Officials - Part 2 (1961)
| Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question (published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1961) — Part 2
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Report of the Officials - Part 3 (1961)
| Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question (published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1961) — Part 3
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Report of the Officials - Part 4 (1961)
| Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question (published by the Ministry of External Affairs in 1961) — Part 4
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President Rajendra Prasad’s address to Parliament - 8 February 1960
| The incursions into parts of the territory of the Union of India, across our traditional and well understood borders, by elements of Chinese forces have, …deeply distressed our people and evoked legitimate and widespread resentment. They impose a great strain on our resources and our nationbuilding endeavours. We regret and deplore these developments on our border. They’ have resulted from the disregard by China of the application of the principles, which it had been mutually agreed to between us, should govern our relations. My Government have taken prompt and calculated measures, both defensive and diplomatic, to meet the threat to our sovereignty.
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People's Daily editorial on Khrushchev's visit to India - 6 March 1960
The foreign policy of peace of the socialist countries finds particularly clear expression in their economic and cultural relations with those countries which have won national independence. Comrade Khrushchev's visit to the four nations provides an example of true international co. operation. The economic and cultural agreements signed by the Soviet Union with India, Burma, Indonesia and Afghanistan make it clear that the economic and cultural co-operation of the socialist countries with these nations is entirely
motivated by the desire to help them develop their national economies and raise their people's living standards. This contrasts sharply with the "aid" from imperialism which is used as a smokescreen for aggression.
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Foreword by GB Pant to India-China Border Problem - March 1960
Foreword by Indian Minister G.B. Pant to Congress Party publication entitled India-China Border Problem, 4 March 1960 (Extract)
The boundary between India and China along its entire length has been well known for centuries and is defined by treaty or international agreements or recognised by custom and tradition. It follows unchanging natural features and is in the main marked out by the Himalayas which are inseparably bound up with our frontiers as, since the dawn of our history, they are interwoven with the fabric of Indian civilisation. The historic northern frontiers of India are so well established that there could be no doubt, except to a mind pre-possessed otherwise, as to where the customary boundary lay. No Chinese Government called it in question in the past.
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Zhou Enlai's speech at the NPC- April 10, 1960
Premier Chou En-lai's speech at the second session of the Second National People's Congress, 10 April 1960 (Extract)
We likewise place ardent hopes in friendly relations between China and India. We are happy to see that the Indian Government has agreed to the Chinese Government's proposal for a meeting between the Premiers of China
and India.
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Morarji Desai's discussions with Chou En-lai - April 1960
Finance Minister Morarji Desai's discussions with Chou En-lai, April 1960 (Extract)
When nobody supported China, India took your side and put up your case in the United Nations and forged friendship with you. You accepted the principles of Panchasheela. India accepted your sovereignty over Tibet, but you had accepted the condition that Tibet's autonomy would be respected and that you would not interfere with it.
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Joint communiqué of the Prime Ministers of India and China - April 25, 1960
At the invitation of the Prime Minister of India, Shri Jawaharlal; Nehru, His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, arrived in Delhi on the 19th April to discuss certain differences relating to the border areas which have arisen between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China.
His Excellency Mr. Chou En-lai was accompanied by His Excellency Marshal Chen Yi, Vice-Premier of the People's Republic of China, His Excellency Mr. Chang Han-fu, Vice-Foreign Minister of China, and other officials of the Chinese' Government.
His Excellency the Premier and his party concluded their visit to India on the morning of the 26th April.
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Nehru’s statement in Lok Sabha - 26 April, 1960
| Our whole argument was based on the Chinese forces having come into our territory. Their [Chinese] argument was that they had always been there not those particular forces, but the Chinese authorities either of Sinkiang in the north or of Tibet had been in constructive or actual possession of these areas for two hundred years. That was such a variance in the factual state that there was no meeting ground. We repeat, again after all these talks that their forces came into this area within quite recent times, in the course of the last year and a half or so. That is our case, to which we hold… In the prolonged talks that took place, this basic disagreement about historical and actual facts came up again and again.
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People's Daily editorial on Chou En-lai's six points - April 27, 1960
Of the six points, the first and the second are objective facts which nobody can deny. If the two sides recognize these facts and reach identical views, a favourable prerequisite will be provided for a reasonable solution of the boundary question. Points three and four are principles for the handling of the boundary question. Obviously they are completely reasonable and some of the geographical principles contained in them have also been repeatedly
stressed by the Indian side on certain occasions. Therefore, there should not be difficulties, too, in reaching identical views on these principles. Points five and six relate to the necessary measures to be taken by the two sides pending a settlement of the boundary question. They are both reasonable and justifiable. In the past, the Indian side .also maintained that individual adjustments may be made on the boundary and that patrolling along the eastern sector should be discontinued.
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Nehru's statement in Rajya Sabha - 29 April, 1960
| So far as the original Akasai Chin road was concerned, it was an old caravan route, hundreds and hundreds of years old. This has always been used as a caravan route by people going from Sinkiang to Tibet. This and the near-by route were used by the Chinese forces, probably in 1951 or may be 1952, that is to say, soon after the Chinese Government came to Tibet.
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Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report for the Year 1959-60 - March 1960
| During the year under review, our relations with China suffered a serious setback. It will be recalled that in the middle of March 1959 there was a sudden uprising in Lhasa leading to. the outbreak of hostilities between the Tibetans and the Chinese forces and, as a consequence, the Dalai Lama, with a small entourage, left Lhasa on 17 March 1959. In view of the age-old cultural and religious relationship between Tibet and India, there was a spontaneous outburst of sympathy with the Tibetan people when the news of the disturbances was published in India. The Government of India made it clear that while they sympathised with the Tibetans in their aspirations for autonomy, they fully recognized the suzerainty of China and could not, in any way, intervene in the developments inside Tibet. When, however, the Dalai Lama sought refuge in India, the Government of India, in exercise of their sovereign right, agreed to grant asylum to him and to afford to the Dalai Lama the courtesy which befitted his recognized spiritual position.
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The Official History of the Conflict
| The Indian Ministry of Defence published the Official History of the 1962 Conflict.
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Ministry of External Affairs - White Paper 6
Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and India and China signed between The Governments of India and China
WHITE PAPER VI
November 1961 – July 1962, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
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Ministry of External Affairs - White Paper 7
Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and India and China signed between The Governments of India and China
WHITE PAPER VII
July- October 1962
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
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Ministry of External Affairs - White Paper 8
Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and India and China signed between The Governments of India and China
WHITE PAPER VIII (extracts)
October 1962 – January 1963
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
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1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China’s Foreign Policy
| Published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington DC, (Working Paper # 48)
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An Introduction to the Henderson Brooks Report
| Neville Maxwell’s summary of the Henderson Brooks Report. This article first appeared in the Economic Political Weekly.
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Conversation between Zhou Enlai and J. Zedebal - December 26, 1962
| On 26 December the Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Comrade Zhou Enlai, paid a return visit to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People’s Republic, Comrade J. Zedenbal. During this meeting, which took place in the residence of Comrade Zedenbal, a conversation took place between the two, which lasted from 11 until 14 hours.
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Benediktov in conversation with R.K. Nehru - December 12, 1962
Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General-Secretary of India, R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China.
Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on 'the other side' — the former Communist world.
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Memorandum of Conversation between Castro and Mikoyan - November 4, 1962
| Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
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Benediktov in conversation with R.K. Nehru - November 2, 1962
Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General-Secretary of India, R.K. Nehru regarding border disputes with China.
Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on 'the other side' — the former Communist world.
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More on Nehru’s Philosophy - October 27, 1962 (People’s Daily)
| More on Nehru’s Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question — Editorial of the Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) on October 27, 1962
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Benediktov in conversation with E.M. Nambudiripad - October 26, 1962
Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad.
Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
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Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the CC CPS - October 20, 1962
| Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on 'the other side' — the former Communist world.
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Benediktov in conversation with the Chinese charge d'affairs in India - October 10, 1962
Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with the charge d'affairs of the Chinese Embassy in India, Comrage E Cheng-Cheng regarding Sino-indian border disputes.
Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on 'the other side' — the former Communist world.
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Benediktov in conversation with Bhupesh Gupta - January 27, 1962
Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, Bhupesh Gupta.
Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
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Benediktov in conversation with Bhupesh Gupta - January 17, 1962
Journal entry by Benediktov describing a conversation with Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India, Bhupesh Gupta.
Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
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The Poisonnous Arrow - The Panchen Lama’s letter to Zhou Enlai on the situation in Tibet
The Secret Report of the 10th Panchen Lama
A Few Chapters of the Report on the sufferings of the masses in Tibet and other Tibetan regions and suggestions for future work to the central authorities through the respected Premier Zhou Enlai (July 1962)
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Nehru's SOS to Kennedy - Two Articles by Inder Malhotra
Forty-eight years have elapsed since the Black November of 1962, when took place the brief but brutal border war with China in the high Himalayas.
As is clear, in retrospect, it was a relatively limited clash of arms — that unfortunately turned into a traumatic military debacle and political disaster for us. So, why recall those days and scratch the wounds that have nearly healed?
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Zhang Wenji-Parthasarathy talks - 1961
| Three conversations between Zhang Wenji, director of the Foreign Ministry’s Asian Affairs Department Number One, and Indian ambassador Parthasarathy. Addressed are the future of Sino-Indian relations, Sino-Indian border issues, and India’s focus on such issues as Bhutan, Sikkim and Pakistan.
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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, South Asia
The volume focuses upon the Kennedy administration's efforts to reorient U.S. policy with respect to South Asia by improving relations with India while maintaining the established alliance relationship with Pakistan. It includes documentation on the impact of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the Indian invasion of Portuguese Goa, and the impact of the Pushtunistan dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It documents U.S. efforts to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan and India, as well as the attempt to take advantage of the border war between India and China that developed in 1962 in order to forge a closer relationship between the United States and India.
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Chinese attack on India — October 1962 (Maj. Gen. K.K. Tewari)
| Extracts from A Soldiers’ Voyage of Self-Dicovery By Maj. Gen. K.K. Tewari (PVSM, AVSM) First published 1995. The story of a PoW in China.
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The Cuban Crisis - Some Documents
| Documents from the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. The Cold War International History Project disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War, in particular new findings from previously inaccessible sources on ’the other side’ — the former Communist world.
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The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis - by M.Y. Prozumenschikov
| The year 1962 was marked by a further intensification of the discord between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Community Party (CCP) and, correspondingly, between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing’s refusal to stay within the boundaries defined by Moscow, which was especially marked after the 22nd CPSU congress at the end of 1961, caused serious anxiety among Soviet officials who frequently spoke of the CCP leadership’s deviation “from the generally fraternal countries and parties” and described Beijing’s authorities as seeking “to more widely bring into the open their disagreements [with us], both in theory and in practice.”
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Extracts of Roderick MacFarquhar’s book on the Cultural Revolution
The Origins of the Cultural Revolution
Roderick MacFarquhar
Volume III
WAR IN THE HIMALAVAS, CRISIS IN THE CARIBBEAN
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The 1960 Border talks between India and China
| Notes on the five sessions of border talks between India and China in 1960.
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Communist China's Domestic Crisis - The Road to 1964
| A CIA paper on the tumultuous years before the Cultural Revolution and particularly Mao's Great Stride Forward between July 1962 and December 1963
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Memorandum of Conversation of Khrushchev with Mao Zedong - 2 October 1959
| We raised this issue also because we do not understand your position, do not understand in particular your conflict with India. We had a dispute with Persia on border issues for 150 years. 3-4 years ago we resolved this issue by transferring to Persia some part of our territory. We consider this issue as follows: five kilometers more land we have or five kilometers less—this is not important. I take Lenin’s example, and he gave to Turkey Kars, Ardahan and Ararat. And until today area a part of the population in the Caucasus are displeased by these measures by Lenin. But I believe that his actions were correct. I am telling about all this to show you that for us this territorial issue was not insurmountable. You have had good relations with India for many years. Suddenly, here is a bloody incident, as result of which [Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal] Nehru found himself in a very difficult position.
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The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: 1961-62 (CIA Papers)
| The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973.
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The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: 1959-61 (CIA Papers)
| The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU CIA Papers Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973.
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The Sino-Indian Border Dispute Section 2: 1950-1959 (CIA Papers)
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973
This collection of declassified analytic monographs and reference aids, designated within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Intelligence (DI) as the CAESAR, ESAU, and POLO series, highlights the CIA’s efforts from the 1950s through the mid-1970s to pursue in-depth research on Soviet and Chinese internal politics and Sino-Soviet relations. The documents reflect the views of seasoned analysts who had followed closely their special areas of research and whose views were shaped in often heated debate. Continuing public interest in the series, as reflected in numerous requests through Freedom of Information and Executive Order channels, led CIA’s Office of Information Management Services (IMS) to conduct a search of Directorate of Intelligence record systems for documents in this series and then undertake a declassification review of all the documents we located.
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An Historical Note of the Frontier
| An historical background of the Himalayan Frontier of India to understand the border issue |
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