The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), let loose again by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
B RAMAN
The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), which had refrained from any major terrorist attack in India , including Jammu & Kashmir, after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, has been let loose again by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the post-26/11 curbs on its ground operations have been removed.
2. These curbs were imposed under international pressure after a number of foreign nationals, including US and Israeli citizens, were killed by it during its strikes in Mumbai. Following their deaths, the relatives of the Americans and Israelis killed had initiated legal action against the ISI and the LET in US courts for their role in the murder of their relatives. It is this legal action that led to the US announcement of a huge reward for evidence that could lead to the arrest and prosecution of Hazfiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the LET.
3. These curbs and the legal action initiated in US courts had led to the LET suspending its operations outside the Pakistani territory. India and the other countries, except Afghanistan, were free of any major activity of the LET since 26/11.There was no evidence to indicate any direct involvement of the ISI and the LET in the terrorist strikes that had taken place in the Indian territory outside J&K since 26/11.
4. While refraining from any ground actions outside Pakistan, the LET appears to have resumed its recruitment, fund collection and motivational activities for nearly a year. This has become evident from reports regarding the activities of Zabiuddin Ansari aka Abu Jundal aka Abu Jindal akla Abu Hamza, a Muslim of Indian origin from Maharashtra, in Saudi Arabia.
5. He was one of the six co-conspirators of the LET and had helped the LET leadership in organising and executing the 26/11 strikes. He was supposed to have been in jail in had managed to go to Saudi Arabia a year ago and had resumed his activities there as the LET representative in Saudi Arabia for making recruitment from amongst Pakistanis and Indian Muslims living there. He used to do this job even before 26/11 and had resumed it last year after coming out of Pakistan.
6. The resumption of his activities from Saudi territory speak of the likelihood of plans for a fresh terrorist strike by the LET. In view of the steep deterioration in Pakistan’s relations with the US, pressures from Washington DC no longer have the desired effect on the ISI, which continues to help the LET as well as the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network despite repeated US admonitions to curb their activities.
7. The undoubted dilution of the US influence over the ISI and the relaxation of the curbs imposed by the ISI on the anti-India activities of the LET, as evidenced from the resumption of the activities of Ansari in Saudi Arabia, indicate fresh dangers of the possibility of a major terrorist strike by the LET against India with the blessings of the ISI.
8. The confusing reports from Islamabad regarding the snafu over a pardon reportedly issued by President Asif Ali Zardari to Sarabjit Singh, an Indian national awaiting the execution of a death sentence for 20 years, also indicate the kind of pressure which the LET is able to exercise on the civilian leadership. Sarabjit Singh had been sentenced to death by a Pakistani court on a charge of being an R&AW agent, but he had been repeatedly appealing against the sentence.
9.On June 26,2012, spokesmen of the President’s office had indicated that the President had decided to commute his death sentence to one of life imprisonment which could pave the way for his pardon and return to his family in India. His reported decision was widely welcomed as a humanitarian gesture in India and was hailed during prime-time TV debates.
10. It has been reported by “the Hindu” correspondent in Islamabad that the reported decision of Zardari to pardon Sarabjit Singh was strongly criticised by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the political wing of the LET, as a shameful act at a time when Ajmal Kasab, the lone LET survivor of the 26/11 strikes, was under a death sentence in Mumbai.
11. Zardari seems to have blinked under the criticism of these organisations and possibly also from the Army and the ISI. His spokesmen have sought to give the impression that no pardon had been issued by Zardari to Sarabjit and that the media had confused a release order issued by the Govt in respect of Surjit Singh, another Indian languishing in Pakistani jail, as indicating an impending release of Sarabjit Singh.
12. The contention of the Presidential spokesman that the confusion was created by the media in India and Pakistan has not carried conviction with many analysts in both the countries. The snafu indicates a possible weakening of the position of Zardari and his decreasing ability to withstand pressure from the Army, the ISI and the LET in matters relating to India.
13. The LET’s ability to dictate terms to the Government has been demonstrated once again. Encouraged by its re-enhanced influence and the backing of the Army and the ISI, it is to be expected that the LET will redouble its efforts for another terrorist strike in India.
14.The decision of the Saudi authorities to transfer Ansari to Indian custody unmindful of the unhappiness of Pakistan will be seen in Pakistan as a blow to its much-flaunted relationship with Saudi Arabia. Zardari is likely to be blamed by the Army and the LET for the failure to dissuade Saudi Arabia from transferring Ansari to Indian custody. It will come as a surprise and shock to the fundamentalist organisations in Pakistan and Indian Muslim organisations such as the Students Islamic Movement of India and the Indian Mujahideen which had in the past maintained close interactions with sympathetic elements in Saudi Arabia.
15. The ISI and the LET will be determined to demonstrate that the action of Saudi Arabia will not weaken their anti-India motivation by orchestrating a fresh terrorist strike against India.
16.The interrogation of Ansari by the Indian authorities should focus on ascertaining the present thinking and the future plans of the ISI and the LET. The other members of the Indian Muslim community, who were in contact with the LET, the ISI and David Headley, of the Chicago cell of the LET, should be quickly identified with Ansari’s help and arrested. Questioning him regarding what role he played in connection with the 26/11 strikes can be taken up later on.
17. Our counter-terrorism mindset continues to be influenced by the “Fix ISI” reflex. It should instead be influenced by the “Counter And Neutralise ISI” mindset. ( 27-6-12)
( I have been in receipt of some questions from foreign journalists on the likely impact of the arrest of Zabiuddin Ansari aka Abu Jindal aka Abu Jundal aka Abu Hamza, a co-conspirator of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, on the Indo-Pakistan peace process. The questions asked are if he makes any sensational disclosures regarding the involvement of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during his interrogation by the Indian authorities, what impact will that have on the peace process and can it lead to fresh pressure on New Delhi to retaliate against Pakistan as there was in 2008. I have tried to cover the likely sequel to his arrest in this article)
Ansari is presently under interrogation by the Indian authorities. It is likely that the interrogation is being carried out by a joint team headed by the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) of the Intelligence Bureau and consisting of officers of the Federal Investigation Agency, and the Mumbai and Delhi Police.
2.The interrogation will focus on two dimensions. The first and the most important dimension will be whether his going to Saudi Arabia from Pakistan presaged any fresh plans of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) to mount a new mass casualty terrorist attack in Indian territory. In this connection, they will ask him questions such as: Was he really arrested by the Pakistani authorities and put in jail to face prosecution as claimed by Senator Rehman Malik, Pakistan’s Interior Minister, on February 12,2009, or was it a charade to hoodwink India? If he was arrested and jailed, how did he manage to get out and go to Saudi Arabia? Did he manage to escape to Saudi Arabia with the complicity of the Pakistani authorities and, if so, who were in the picture regarding this complicity? What was the purpose? Was it to organise a fresh terrorist strike in India ? If so, what were the instructions to him by the ISI and the LET in this regard? When did he arrive in Saudi Arabia? How? Under what travel document? Issued before 26/11 or after? When was he arrested by the Saudi authorities? Under what circumstances? What did he tell the Saudi authorities during the interrogation by them? Was the Pakistani Embassy in Saudi Arabia aware of his arrest and of the plans of the Saudi authorities to hand him over to India? If so, did the Pakistani authorities try to stop it? What happened in the LET and ISI headquarters after 26/11 to organise the cover-up? What are the details of the cover-up plans? What are the present intentions and plans of the ISI and the LET? Were they talking in terms of resuming terrorist strikes in India? If so, what kind of infrastructure like sleeper cells they have in India? Who are the members of these cells? What are likely to be their targets?
3.The second dimension will be to complete the gaps in the reconstruction of the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The gaps are: Were there any more Indian Muslims involved in assisting the LET and the ISI in planning and carrying out the strikes? Who are the others? Where are they? Why the targets attacked in Mumbai were chosen? Who did the target selection? Why foreigners, particularly the Americans and other Westerners, were attacked? Who took the decision to attack them? When was the decision to mount the attack taken? By whom? Was it an idea initially suggested by the LET and subsequently backed by the ISI or was it an original idea of the ISI given to the LET for execution? What was the role of Headley of the Chicago cell of the LET in the entire operation? Who were his contacts and accomplices in India?
4. Ansari is a much more important catch than Ajmal Kasab. Kasab was uneducated. Ansari is educated having reportedly studied in a technology institute of Maharashtra. Kasab was a foot jihadi who carried out orders. Ansari was part of the team of six main conspirators who helped Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the head of the LET, in the planning and execution of the attacks. Ansari was in Pakistan before, during and after the strikes liaising with the LET leadership and was thus having knowledge of what happened during that period. His evidence will, therefore, have greater credibility and importance than that of Kasab in the eyes of the courts and the international community.
5.If his disclosures indicate that his escape to Saudi Arabia was part of a diabolical plan of the ISI and the LET to organise a fresh strike in India, it could have a negative impact on Indo-Pakistan relations and affect the peace process. Otherwise, not. There is unlikely to be any pressure on the Government of India for a retaliatory strike on Pakistan.
6. The US will be closely monitoring the interrogation to find out what he says about the attack on US nationals. If he says that the US nationals were attacked and killed with the prior knowledge and on the instructions of the ISI it could cause a further set-back to Pakistan’s relations with the US and make India hesitate to go forward on the peace process. ( 26-6-12)
Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister of the Government of India, has been quoted as saying on June 25,2012, as follows: “"Abu Jindal has been apprehended and remanded to custody of law enforcement agencies."
2. Some media reports disseminated earlier had said: “On June 21, 2012, the Intelligence Branch took custody of Abu Hamza allies Sayed Zabiuddin, on his deportation from Saudi Arabia at the Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi and later on June 25, 2012, formally handed him over to Delhi Police, that announced the arrest, for him to be produced at the New Delhi Court for trial.”
3.Some other media reports had said: “The name of Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Hamza alias Abu Jindal first surfaced in connection with an arms haul in Aurangabad in 2006. He is also believed to have had a hand in the 2006 Mumbai train blasts, was allegedly one of six Lashkar-e-Taiba handlers of the terrorists who attacked Mumbai on November 26, 2008 and has played a role in many other terror attacks all over the country, including an alleged plot to assassinate Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi.”
4.The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) has been emulating the example of the Palestinian terrorist organisations in allotting kuniyats ( assumed names) to its field operatives in order to conceal their real identity. These kuniyats are chosen from the names of the Companions of the Holy Prophet.
5.The Palestinian terrorist organisations generally follow the principle of allotting one kuniyat to one operative. Till that operative dies, the same kuniyat is not allotted to any other operative. The LET does not follow any such practice. Sometimes, the same kuniyat is allotted to more than one operative and sometimes the same operative is allotted more than one kuniyat. This makes identification difficult.
6. Since the LET started operating in Indian territory in 1993, it has been frequently using the kuniyat Abu Hamza. In the late 1990s, the man in charge of publicity and propaganda in the LET headquarters in Muridke in Pakistani Punjab used to be called Abu Hamza.
7. In 2002, the Tamil Nadu Police had arrested some Tamil Muslims who had formed an organisation called Muslim Defence Force (MDF). They reportedly stated during their interrogation that they were motivated to form the MDF by one Abu Hamsa, alias Abdul Bari, an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia and associated with the LET, and one Abu Omar, a Pakistani Muslim working there, after the Gujarat riots.
8. The kuniyats Abu Hamza and Abu Jindal had figured in the investigation reports regarding the involvement of Sayed Zabiuddin Ansari , reportedly of Georai area of Beed district in Maharashtra, in the terrorist attack on some suburban trains of Mumbai in July,2006, and in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
9.Ajmal Kasab, the lone survivor of the 10-member Pakistani terrorist team of the LET which attacked Mumbai on 26/11, had reportedly stated during his interrogation by the Mumbai Police that one of the Karachi-based conspirators who had trained the 10 members of the LET team, and taught them Hindi was known as Abu Jindal. From the description of his, he appeared to be an Indian Muslim.
10. On February 12,2009, Senator Rehman Malik, the Interior Minister of Pakistan, had claimed that the Pakistani police had made a breakthrough in the investigation of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and arrested seven persons for involvement in the conspiracy. One of the persons named by him was Abu Hamza. However, he did not give his real name. According to claims made by Pakistani authorities, after the completion of the investigation, these persons, including Abu Hamza, have been charge-sheeted before an Anti-Terrorism Court, but the trial has not made any progress due to frequent transfers of the judges and the judges frequently going on leave.
11.The interrogation of the arrested person by the Delhi and Mumbai Police should help to establish whether the person named as Abu Jindal by Kasab and whether the person named as Abu Hamza by the Pakistani Interior Minister are one and the same and whether Abu Jindal and Abu Hamza are the kuniyats of Syed Zabiuddin Ansari, an Indian Muslim, as believed by our Police.
12. If all the three are established to be one and the same, the question will arise as to how Abu Hamza arrested by the Pakistani authorities on February 12,2009,managed to go to Saudi Arabia? Did he escape due to negligence or complicity or was he quietly released by the Pakistani authorities or is his landing in the hands of the Delhi police the result of back channel co-operation between the intelligence agencies of India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia consequent upon the recent visit of the Director of our Intelligence Bureau to Islamabad as a member of the Indian officials’ team headed by our Home Secretary for talks with their Pakistani counterparts. It would be difficult to find answers to these questions unless the Government of India is forthcoming. If back-channel intelligence co-operation has played a role, the Government of India will not be forthcoming in order not to embarrass the other two Governments.
13. However, if back channel co-operation had played no role and if the complicity of the Pakistani agencies with the LET had played a role in this matter, the implications could be more serious, indicating that the Pakistani agencies want to resume mass casualty terrorist strikes in Indian territory using the LET once again. This would call for the utmost alertness by our agencies. ( 25-6-12)
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