The brief and unsuccessful Wagner rebellion against Russia's Ministry of Defence (MoD) highlights internal discord in Moscow. Speculation surrounds the origins and conclusion of the rebellion, questioning whether it was a result of miscalculations or a carefully orchestrated maneuver. Additionally, there are inquiries about the potential collusion between Wagner commander Yevgeny Prigozhin and President Putin.
The failure of the Russian forces to achieve victory in Ukraine had consequences for the Wagner Group, which was subsequently withdrawn from various African operations.
The Wagner Group has served as Moscow's tool to advance its objectives through non-state actors. Led by Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch, mercenary leader, and well-connected caterer, the group gained prominence after Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. As a result, the United States imposed sanctions on Wagner and Prigozhin.
Subsequently, the Wagner Group represented Russian interests in approximately 20 African countries. Notably, it was involved in an unsuccessful attempt to quell the insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province, which eventually required Rwandan troops to restore order. Wagner's activities extended to Libya, Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic, where they either replaced French forces or aligned themselves with various factions during internal conflicts. Their primary objective was to support institutions favored by Russia and suppress opposition forces. In exchange, they received Russian arms and gained concessions for the extraction of gold and other natural resources.
Due to the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Russian forces' inability to secure victory, the Wagner Group was recalled from several African operations to participate in the conflict. Their performance in the Battle of Bakhmut received appreciation from President Putin.
What compelled Prigozhin to raise the banner of revolt? Some analysts suggest that he vocalized the frustration felt by his soldiers, who had been denied supplies and ammunition during the Bakhmut campaign. Wagner had suffered significant casualties, potentially leading to a loss of morale. Blaming the MoD for these shortcomings seemed like a viable approach.
Prigozhin was also dissatisfied with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Gen Valery Gerasimov. They were pushing for the integration of Wagner into the regular forces and insisted that Wagner soldiers sign contracts with the ministry sooner rather than later. This prospect threatened to confine Wagner solely to African operations once the Battle of Bakhmut concluded.
The fact that Prigozhin managed to seize a military stronghold in Rostov and publicly initiate the rebellion indicates that Russia is facing challenges on the Ukrainian front. Multiple voices within Russia are now advocating for a revamp of the MoD.
The Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the KGB, is believed to be more aligned with Prigozhin and potentially open to changes in the top leadership of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). This alignment aims to foster cooperation between the ministry and the FSB instead of competing for power in Moscow.
The Wagner Group's leadership is primarily based in St. Petersburg, limiting their influence to playing a significant role rather than having control over Moscow. It is evident that Wagner's ambitions during the rebellion surpassed their capabilities, revealing more frustration than strength.
The future progression of the war raises several considerations. If the campaign is going well, there would be no public divisions among the various players. Prigozhin publicly criticized the MoD, while others expressed their dissatisfaction more discreetly.
With the upcoming presidential election in March 2024, Putin is seeking a victory in Ukraine. The campaign has already seen the dismissal or death of 16 generals, indicating a high level of attrition at that level. The Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff could potentially become casualties of a reassessment of the war prompted by the rebellion. In that case, the rebellion's limited objective may be achieved. Prigozhin may have misjudged Putin's support for Wagner, as the group was unable to advance on Moscow.
Moscow now needs to closely examine the Ukraine campaign and draw lessons from the Wagner rebellion. While special forces have contributed to some Russian victories, they ultimately undermine state institutions and, therefore, require better control. Can the regular army play a more effective role in achieving Putin's political objectives in the coming months? This would necessitate well-trained soldiers, improved supplies, and clearly defined objectives. A change in leadership within the MoD and the military would also require a shift in strategy and tactics.
If such changes occur, will they ensure political harmony in Moscow? Putin needs coordination between the FSB and the MoD so that they can work together rather than against each other. The current lack of unity is evident and impacts the campaign on the ground. It is possible that a significant number of Wagner personnel have not deserted and may accept contracts from the MoD since they are ultimately mercenaries who require regular payment. However, it remains uncertain if they can exhibit the same discipline as members of a regular army.
Prigozhin had his means of funding Wagner and the MoD through African operations, which he accuses the MoD of misusing. With operations in Africa curtailed, casualties suffered by Wagner, and Prigozhin facing exile, the treatment of Wagner personnel needs to be reevaluated if they are to remain an effective force
Incorporating them into a broader Russian strategy to address Ukraine for positive results in the next eight months will be a critical factor.
Unlike Richard Wagner's operas, the actions of the Wagner Group have caused disharmony. The offensive in Ukraine continues, as does the Russian defense, but Prigozhin's actions have exposed potential weaknesses within the Russian system.
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