SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR NEXT PRIME MINISTER

Dear Future Prime Minister, Congratulations on being appointed as the new Prime Minister of our country. You have an onerous task before you, for you have a lot to undo what your predecessor and his colleagues and advisers have done or not done, before you commence governing the nation. I am convinced that you will have the intellectual and moral capacity to take the nation forward. There are many areas of good governance that will need your attention. These include the economy as well as the rampant corruption in the government. However, the subject I am bringing to your notice is the precarious state of "national security," which is perhaps the most important and hence, I am bringing it to your focus at this early stage of steering the nation over at least the next five years, if not more. There are three broad facets of national security that need to be discussed. These are the current state of the Indian military, the abysmal lack of any national security strategies and the rapidly deteriorating civil-military relations. All three will need your urgent attention as these are issues of the utmost importance if the nation has to progress in a secure environment. *Contentious issues* - The Indian military has probably reached its lowest point since the major debacle of 1962 and for similar reasons that prevailed at that time - The defence budget has been steadily going down and presently the bulk of the allocations can only meet the revenue expenditure - We have been unable to formulate a national security strategy. Consequently, we depend exclusively on 'soft power' and enacting more laws, but see no merit in pursuing 'hard power' - Despite a lot of lip service, we have not taken any serious actions to indigenise defence production. The Indian military has probably reached its lowest point since the major debacle of 1962 and for similar reasons that prevailed at that time. It was the gross neglect of the armed forces that had resulted in the humiliation of 1962 and history is apparently being repeated once more. In the last ten years, the military has again been starved of funds. These have been diverted to launch populous measures, which encourage corruption and help no one. Resultantly, little or no modernisation of the military has been carried out, no security-related policy initiatives have been started and the bureaucracy, with unfettered powers, has stifled the legitimate aspirations of the armed forces. The morale of the armed forces has fallen to extremely low levels and the country has become highly vulnerable to hostile actions by our adversaries. The defence budget has been steadily going down and presently stands much below two per cent of the GDP, when the accepted requirement is at least three per cent. The bulk of the allocations can only meet the revenue expenditure and what little is left for modernisation is conveniently siphoned back by the Ministry of Finance to balance its books and make additional funds available for dubious populous measures of the ruling party. The much vaunted procurement organisation of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which has incidentally been reorganised at least six times in the last 15 years or so, has produced zilch. It is unable to expend even the meagre allocated capital budget. It is not that the armed forces do not plan adequately, but it is lack of commitment and understanding of matters military by the MoD, redundant procedures and sitting on files to make money on the side that are responsible for cases not fructifying. The army seems to have suffered most as far as modernisation is concerned, as its budgetary allocations have decreased considerably. The equipment state of the two fighting arms -- armour and infantry -- is abysmal. On paper, India fields a total of 3,274 tanks. Of these, only 485 T-90s and 124 Arjuns can be considered modern and even these have major problems like inadequate night fighting capability and sufficient ammunition and spares support. The equipment state of the mechanised infantry is similar. Tracked vehicles, which should have been replaced decades back, continue to be on the inventory of units. The infantry, which is the mainstay of the army, continues to be equipped with obsolete INSAS rifles. The much vaunted project of fielding state of the art modern infantrymen under the Futuristic Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) programme is way behind schedule. The infantry is also short of a large number of carbines, machine guns, anti-material rifles, mine-protected vehicles, night-vision devices, bullet-proof jackets and other equipment. Our special and airborne forces are still not equipped with appropriate weapons and combat systems. The sad saga of equipping the artillery with modern guns is too well known to bear repetition. The equipment state of the Air Defence Artillery is even worse, as they continue to field obsolete weapons of 1970's vintage. The Army Aviation Corps (AAC) continues to fly obsolete Chetak and Cheetah helicopters. For nearly a decade, there is only talk of procuring approximately 200 light utility helicopters, as contracts keep getting delayed or terminated. The navy is also badly off. The state of naval platforms, both surface and sub-surface is too well known in recent months to need any elaboration. The submarine arm is particularly badly off. A brilliant Chief of Navy Staff has had to resign owning moral responsibility because he has character, although it is not he who should have resigned but the Minister of Defence and the bureaucrats who could not provide equipment and spares, despite being constantly reminded of the bad equipment state. The state of the air force is equally precarious. It is desperate for more fighters. Its 34 squadrons will reduce to 26 in 2017, if the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft, Rafael, is not inducted by then. There is urgency to replace the ageing MiG fighters, 482 of which have crashed in the last four decades. Their replacement, the indigenous Tejas fighters, continue to be on the assembly line, but none have been produced as yet. Joint endeavours remain frozen although everyone talks about them. A so-called Integrated Headquarters is in existence as a result of the recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) of 2001, but it is headless as no Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff has been appointed. The main reason is that the bureaucracy only believes in retaining and expanding its turf and powers and is least concerned with the security of the nation. The Department of Ex-servicemen Welfare is a joke, as it is more concerned with taking hapless veterans to courts instead of assisting them. The political leadership has long been blasé about the armed forces and prefers not to deal directly with the military hierarchy. Vintage structures continue and forming integrated theatre commands are only talking points in seminars. We have been unable to formulate a national security strategy as the political leadership has sacrificed merit and has placed its reliance only on loyalists and yes-men in the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) and in other key positions, instead of people who understand grand strategy and military strategy. Since the inception of the office of NSA, we have had only diplomats and police officers heading it. Consequently, we depend exclusively on "soft power" and enacting more laws, but see no merit in pursuing "hard power." Despite a lot of lip service, we have not taken any serious actions to indigenise defence production. We continue to waste precious funds on inefficient and corrupt organisations like the Ordnance Factories, Defence PSUs and the DRDO, where middlemen rule the roost. We have ignored private companies which are efficient, have the expertise and are keen to produce defence equipment. One can continue in this vein and list out all structural and equipment weaknesses, but with no transformation, utter lack of any modernisation of weaponry, and existing shortages of all types of equipment and munitions, the Indian military is not in a position to fight and win battles and wars. We seem to have psyched ourselves to believe that our country will not be embroiled in any war, forgetting that our growth as a military power is an essential component of our ascendancy to "great power" status. No amount of economic development can be sustained unless it is underpinned by military security of a very high order. I appeal to you Sir, to set in motion urgent measures, on assuming office, to seriously overhaul the present defence machinery, modernise it and make it responsive to the needs of the Indian military and the nation. Urgent measures to be taken include the integration of Service Headquarters and MoD, simplification of financial vetting procedures, delegation of powers for capital procurements, increasing the processing capacity of the procurement authorities, proceeding rapidly towards joint endeavours, placing professional experts in important positions, setting in motion the comprehensive restructuring of ordnance factories, defence PSUs and DRDO, opening defence production to the trade and above all, having a continuing dialogue with the armed forces hie rarchy instead of continuing with the present archaic and peculiar system of interacting with them through middlemen like bureaucrats, diplomats and other civil officials. The Indian military has proven its credentials of loyalty, apolitical demeanour and love for the country and needs to be trusted unequivocally. Jai Hind, Sir, and best wishes for a productive tenure. *The writer is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff and the Founder Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS)*