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Tuesday, 14 July 2026

BrahMos Diplomacy: How India is building a strategic counter to China's "String of Pearls"PART 1-BRIG HEMANT MAHAJAN

 


The emergence of what analysts increasingly describe as a "BrahMos Belt" across Southeast Asia has the potential to create a strategic counterweight to China"s military expansion.


The strategic competition between India and China has expanded far beyond the Himalayan border. Today, the contest encompasses the entire Indo-Pacific region, where both nations seek to shape the future security architecture of Asia. While China has pursued a long-term strategy of establishing military footholds, ports, and strategic partnerships around India, popularly known as the "String of Pearls" strategy, India has begun responding through a combination of military modernization, strategic partnerships, naval expansion, and defence exports.

Among the most significant instruments of India's emerging strategy is the export of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. The sale of BrahMos missiles to the Philippines, ongoing negotiations with Vietnam, and discussions with Indonesia represent more than commercial defence transactions. They constitute a carefully crafted geopolitical strategy aimed at strengthening regional deterrence against Chinese expansionism while simultaneously establishing India as a credible security provider in the Indo-Pacific.


The emergence of what analysts increasingly describe as a "BrahMos Belt" across Southeast Asia has the potential to create a strategic counterweight to China's military expansion. This development reflects India's transition from a continental power primarily concerned with land borders to a maritime power actively shaping regional security dynamics.

Brahmos 

China's String of Pearls Strategy

China's growing military and economic presence around India is part of a broader effort to secure sea lines of communication, protect energy supplies, and project military power into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

The most prominent components of this strategy include:

Gwadar, Pakistan

Located near the Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar Port provides China with strategic access to the Arabian Sea. Developed under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the port serves both economic and potential military purposes. It allows Beijing to monitor maritime traffic and potentially support People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployments in the western Indian Ocean.

Hambantota, Sri Lanka

China's acquisition of a 99-year lease on Hambantota Port has become a textbook example of strategic influence through infrastructure investment. While Sri Lanka maintains that the facility is commercial, its strategic location close to major sea lanes gives China a valuable logistical foothold.

Chittagong, Bangladesh

China has significantly expanded its economic and military relationship with Bangladesh. Although Chittagong is not a Chinese military base, Chinese investments and defence cooperation provide Beijing with growing influence in the Bay of Bengal.

Myanmar: Kyaukpyu and Strategic Access

China's access to ports and infrastructure projects in Myanmar provides a crucial link between Yunnan Province and the Indian Ocean. These facilities reduce China's dependence on the vulnerable Malacca Strait and enhance its strategic flexibility.
 


Djibouti

China's first overseas military base in Djibouti marks its transition into a global military power. Situated near critical maritime chokepoints, the base supports Chinese naval operations extending from Africa to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

Arms Transfers and Military Partnerships

China has complemented its infrastructure strategy with extensive arms sales to Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and other countries. These include fighter aircraft, submarines, warships, missiles, air-defence systems, and surveillance equipment. Such transfers strengthen China's influence while creating long-term military dependencies.

Collectively, these developments provide China with the ability to monitor India's maritime activities, protect Chinese shipping, and potentially constrain Indian strategic options during crises.

India's Response: The Rise of BrahMos Diplomacy

India's response has increasingly focused on building deterrence through partnerships rather than establishing overseas military bases. At the centre of this strategy lies the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, one of the world's fastest operational cruise missiles. Capable of speeds approaching Mach 3 and possessing high precision and survivability, BrahMos presents a formidable anti-ship and land-attack capability.

Philippines: The First Breakthrough

The Philippines became the first foreign customer for BrahMos in 2022. The deployment of BrahMos coastal defence batteries significantly enhances Manila's ability to defend its maritime interests in the South China Sea.

For China, the presence of BrahMos missiles in the Philippines complicates naval operations and raises the costs of coercive actions. For India, the deal represents a major strategic breakthrough, demonstrating its ability to contribute directly to regional security.

Vietnam: A Natural Strategic Partner

Vietnam has long resisted Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. The country possesses one of Southeast Asia's most capable militaries and shares India's concerns regarding Chinese assertiveness.

The acquisition of BrahMos missiles by Vietnam would significantly strengthen Hanoi's anti-access and area-denial capabilities. Given Vietnam's geographic location along China's southern maritime approaches, such a deployment would have substantial strategic implications.

Indonesia: Guarding the Maritime Crossroads

Indonesia occupies a critical position astride major maritime routes connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Chinese activities near the Natuna Islands have generated growing concern in Jakarta.

Potential BrahMos deployment in Indonesia would strengthen maritime deterrence and contribute to regional stability. Together with the Philippines and Vietnam, Indonesia could form part of a broader network of states capable of resisting coercion

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